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In a perfect world, when an employee is injured on the job, the employee files for workers compensation, benefits are determined, and the employee returns to work when they are cleared to do so. But sometimes, employers view the risk of increased premiums as an unjust burden and terminate their injured worker for filing a claim. What, then, is an employee to do?

In Ohio, the law prohibits employers from discharging, demoting, reassigning, or otherwise punishing employees because they filed a claim for workers’ compensation. But employees have very little time to act on this claim, because the law requires an employee to deliver written notice of a claimed violation to the employer within 90 days of the retaliation. If the employee fails to perform this act, they forfeit the right to sue the employer for workers compensation retaliation.

Further, the employee must also file suit within 180 days of the date of the retaliatory act. This is one of the shortest statutes of limitations in the field of employment law.

Because of these very short time periods, employees who believe they have been fired or retaliated against for seeking workers’ compensation benefits should consider contacting qualified legal counsel as soon as possible to assess their case and protect their rights.

Contact Matt Okiishi (513.943.6659) if you may have such a claim.

On Friday, July 18, 2025, the Sixth Circuit issued a ruling reversing a trial court’s dismissal of our client Matthew Warman’s Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim against Mount St. Joseph University and its individual police officers. Attorney Matthew S. Okiishi has served as local and co-counsel to Ron Berutti of Murray-Nolan Berutti LLC (licensed in New York, New Jersey, and Kentucky) in this matter.

Mr. Warman ‘s lawsuit alleges that, while a student at MSJU, he was invited the campus police station to discuss his refusal to take the Covid-19 vaccine on religious and medical grounds. This “meeting” quickly turned sour. Over the course of an hour, Mr. Warman was taken to a back room and told, among other things, that he was not free to leave, that he was an “[expletive] idiot,”  “should get a new religion,” that his “beliefs were wrong,” and should “grow the [expletive] up and get the shot.”

Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals held that this conduct plausibly established a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court further held that MSJU and the individual officers involved could be subject to liability as “state actors” under 29 U.S.C. §1983, and that the university and officers were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the proceedings. The Court further cast doubt on whether privately employed campus police officers can avail themselves of qualified immunity. The matter has been remanded to the trial court for continued litigation.

A copy of the decision in the case styled Warman v. Mount St. Joseph Univ., et al., is linked here. The opinion has been recommended for full publication, signifying its importance and significance.

Prior to June 5, 2025, an employee suing for discrimination in this Circuit was required present a prima facie case showing  that: 1) they belong to a protected class; 2) they were qualified for the job; 3) they experienced an adverse employment action; and 4) the employer treated similarly situated employees outside their protected class more favorably. But members of a “majority-group” (think: White, male, heteronormative, and/or Christian) suing in the Sixth Circuit was required to show an additional element, namely that there were “background circumstances” that his was the “unusual” employer that discriminated against the majority. 

Now, however, the Supreme Court of the United States has reversed this longstanding requirement. Writing for a unanimous court in in Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, No. 23-1039, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson found that this rule “cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or prior precedent.” The Court reasoned that because Title VII bars discrimination against any individual on the basis of protected characteristics and does not distinguish between minority or majority groups, there is no room under the statute for a special pleading or proof standard to be imposed on majority-group plaintiffs. 

Without the heightened “background circumstances” requirement, majority-group employees who believe that they were discriminated against on the basis of their race, gender, national origin, or religion only have to prove the same prima facie case as minority employees.

Whether juries will need to be “sold” on the idea that “reverse discrimination” is possible remains to be seen. But for now, the path for majority-group employees to reach a jury trial has been made easier.