We have a fantastic (if we do say so ourselves) 8-part series on legal issues on new construction for residential and commercial projects. The series, as a general proposition, provides helpful information for both contractors (builders) and buyers.

New construction: The problem of “what” is to be built >>

New construction: The “When” >>

New construction: Change orders, allowances and selections can significantly impact price >>

New construction: On whose land are you building? >>

New construction: Cost-plus versus fixed-price >>

New construction: What form of contract? >>

New construction: Ohio residential buyers absolutely protected from liens in limited circumstances >>

New construction: Properly documenting change orders >>

If we can help you “Make a Difference” with documentation of a new construction project, contact Isaac T. Heintz at (513) 943-6654.  For a dispute relating to a new construction project, contact Brad M. Gibson at (513) 943-6661.

We explore the issues of insurers and indemnitors in these two previous articles:

Navigating turbulent waters: Insurers and indemnitors (Part 1) >>

Indemnities and Warranty Deeds: Open-ended access to your checkbook >>

These blog entries primarily provide an understanding of indemnities from two different perspectives: That of the indemnitee (the person who is protected under an indemnity), and that of the indemnitor (the person providing the protection).

In this article, we explore multiple facets of the indemnity, and its enforcement.

As a starting point, in contractual indemnities, various terminology is used for risk-shifting provisions:

  • Indemnify
  • Defend
  • Hold harmless

These three terms, to us, have different meaning, but in application courts have interpreted them interchangeably, or at least to overlap.

  • “Indemnify” is an open-ended commitment to both cover the expenses of a third party claim and potentially to defend against that action, i.e., pay the the indemnity attorneys fees.
  • “Defend” more specifically covers that obligation to protect the first party from suits.  It probably does not include a broad indemnity for the underlying liability.
  • And “hold harmless” generally means simply that the second party will himself not raise a claim against the first party for certain claims, almost like a prospective release.  “Party B will hold Party A harmless from claims relating to the underground storage tanks on the property.”

But, because courts fail to make these fine-line distinctions, when drafting contract provisions perhaps more precision as to what is intended is in order.  In some instances, a party will provide all three protections: “Tenant will indemnify, defend and hold harmless Landlord from all claims relating to his occupancy of the property.”  Other times, it would be appropriate to tighten the scope of the risk-shifting provision: “Landlord has disclosed to Tenant the leaking roof on the property, and Tenant agrees to hold harmless Landlord against claims relating to the same.”

Because contractual risk-shifting provisions essentially provide open-ended access to a checkbook of the indemnitor, great care should be exercised in agreeing to such provisions.  For, even if a claim ultimately is unfounded, the cost to defend can bankrupt even well-capitalized parties.  Consideration also should be given to indemnities that must be personally signed, thus voluntarily piercing the corporate veil carefully constructed to protect the individual owners.

Today, for example, it is common for lenders to ask that individual investors in a real estate transaction personally indemnify and defend a lender against environmental risks associated with real property being financed.  Caution should be exercised in undertaking such an open-ended risk.  For, the very reason we advise clients to take title to property in the form of an LLC or corporation is to shield the individual form such open-ended liability.  An indemnity blows past that carefully-planned protection.

Finally, how is an indemnity or insurance provision enforced when the indemnitor or insurer chooses to ignore his contractual obligation?  This can be accomplished in one of two ways:

  1. At the time the claim is pending, the indemnitee can bring a “declaratory judgment” action asking the Court to declare that the indemnitor provide the promised protection.
  2. After the fact, as long as proper demand has been made previously for such a defense, a monetary damages claim can be brought to compensate indemnitee for the damages caused by indemnitor’s breach of his contractual obligation.

In many ways indemnities are “super” contract provisions because instead of defining specific contractual obligations (e.g., to make payments, to pay taxes, or to repair a roof) they protect against open-ended and sometimes unknown obligations, and indeed obligations from third parties who are foreign to the transaction being undertaken.

Whenever I review a contract, a lease, a mortgage or loan agreement, or other contractual agreement for a client, my antenna is raised when I read that my client is agreeing to “indemnify,” “defend,” “hold harmless,” “protect” or words of similar impact some other party. Those “super” contract provisions should be undertaken with due consideration to the impact on the indemnitor.

 

In perhaps the most audacious litigation gambit I have been involved with for a client, we resuscitated a failed Ohio Supreme Court case with a U.S. District Court action that rendered a favorable settlement for our client over…the elimination of his curb cut.

Curbs serve several purposes on a roadway: They are part of the storm water management system, moving water along a road’s edge into a storm sewer, and they operate as an important traffic control mechanism, whereby access onto roadways to and from individual properties is “regulated” by “curb cuts.”  A curb cut is the lowering or elimination of an otherwise continuous curb along a roadway, that is too high for traffic to traverse, to allow ingress and egress into private property.

Ohio has a long and rich tradition of allowing, as a constitutional right, access to one’s property through a curb cut onto a public road. See, e.g., OTR v. Columbus (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 203, 667 N.E.2d 8.

With that as background, in 1998 our client, Preschool Development Co., developed its property along S.R. 73 in Springboro, Ohio into a preschool.  It purchased a single family residence that enjoyed an existing curb cut onto S.R. 73, demolished the building, and proposed to build a new preschool there with direct access onto S.R. 73.  The City of Springboro at first conditioned zoning approval of the new development on a promise from the developer that when a new drug store was developed next door, we would close our curb cut onto S.R. 73, and access our property only through the drug store parking lot.  We objected, citing to the constitutional principle noted above.  Eventually, the owner reached a contractual agreement with the City that when the drug store parcel ultimately was developed, the owner would install, at its expense, a median in S.R. 73, thus preventing left turns into and out of the property, a reasonable compromise that allowed the development to go forward while at the same time improving traffic safety along S.R. 73.

As a side note, Ohio law provides, and we certainly believe, that municipalities can require anything they want to assure traffic safety along their roads.  But, if they are going to unconstitutionally burden a property to accomplish that, they simply must pay just compensation to the owner to achieve that end.  That is the law.

Fast forward 48 months and the new drug store parcel is being developed.  The City makes a renewed demand upon the property owner to close his curb cut and access his preschool parcel through the drug store parking lot.  We located and dusted off the agreement calling for a median in S.R. 73, instead, and the City persisted.  We resisted.

Finally, one fine July Monday morning, my client calls and informs me that, overnight, the City closed his curb cut by building a 6-inch curb in front of his property.  His only access to his property is across the drug store parcel.  Even worse, he has no legally-enforceable easement across the drug store parcel parking lot, meaning the City of Springboro has effectively land-locked his parcel and rendered it unmarketable.

Under constitutional principles, one is unable to sue a City directly for damages arising from a “taking,” but rather you sue the municipality –in what is called a mandamus action — to make them sue you for eminent domain – and establish judicially in that second proceeding the value of the property taken.  Under Ohio law, Plaintiffs have a choice for “mandamus actions,” to proceed initially and directly at the Common Pleas Court, the Court of Appeals, or at the Ohio Supreme Court.  Since the law and facts were clearly on our client’s side, we elected to take the case directly and initially to the Ohio Supreme Court.

So we proceeded in an original action at the Ohio Supreme Court for a mandamus requiring that the City “take” our client’s property and pay him just compensation for it.  As noted above, this action was supported by a long line of Ohio cases providing that a Curb Cut was a constitutionally-protected interest in Ohio that cannot be taken without just compensation.  We were certain the Supreme Court would grant the requested relief, and our client would be compensated for his loss.  This confidence was compounded by the fact that the “taking” was not just of a curb cut, but of all legal access to my client’s property – rendering it value-less.

Much to our surprise, the Ohio Supreme Court, in this 4-3 decision, denied our client’s requested relief. They essentially ignored 150 years of precedent on the topic – and the further defective easement rendering our client’s property worthless – in what we felt was a bad decision.  The problem was, that by electing to first go to the Supreme Court for our relief, there was no court to which we could appeal the decision.  In short, our client was stiffed.

But we were not content to rest on that outcome.  The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution provides that “private property” shall not be “taken for public use, without just compensation.”  Thus, again, the City, the State, have the right to take our client’s property (his curb cut access to S.R 73), but they must pay for it.  There is federal precedent that when the State’s courts refuse to provide a mechanism to provide that just compensation – in Ohio a mandamus action – one can avail themselves of a remedy directly in federal court.

As a huge bonus to our client, an award of attorneys fees is generally not available to a Plaintiff either for a mandamus action forcing the bringing of a condemnation action, or for the defense of the action to establish damages — thus making much of this litigation impractical if not impossible.  But when the State has effectively denied the Plaintiff any remedy for the taking, an action lies under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1988, which includes the right in the victorious Plaintiff to recover attorneys fees.  In a perverse way, the Ohio Supreme Court had done us huge a favor by making ripe our federal constitutional claims by denying the takings claim in State court.

Thus, we filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and drew knowledgeable Judge Arthur Spiegel.  Judge Spiegel was fantastic, from the first meeting of the litigants forward.  For, as a young attorney, he too was a real estate lawyer, and intuitively understood the principle that one has a property right in and to a curb cut, and was prepared to enforce that right.

The litigation was complex and arduous, with laborious motion work, discovery, expert witnesses, and hearings lasting more than a year.  The matter was complicated by issues of res judicata and issue preclusion, as well as the difficult-to-interpret, difficult-to-apply Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   Hundreds of hours were spent on briefing, and tens of thousands of dollars were invested on expert witness testimony.

In the end, we filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the question of liability.  The City filed a cross motion for summary judgment seeking essentially to extend and enforce the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court.  Judge Spiegel thankfully issued a decision – which we thought correct – granting partial summary judgment to the Plaintiff on the issue of liability.  Thus, we were headed to trial solely on the question of the value of the taking exacted by the City of Springboro.  It was a long-fought-for and sweet victory.

Facing that consequence — a trial solely on damages, where the City would have to pay Plaintiff’s attorneys fees, the City quickly settled – paying our client a fair amount for the “taking” and the full sum of all our client’s attorneys fees expended in the matter.

After five years of battle, the client was completely made whole.


Our deep knowledge of Ohio real estate law, combined with our extensive public interest law experience and incredible persistence and resilience, surely made a difference not only for this client, but to vindicate an important constitutional principle for all Ohioans.

Our firm is frequently called by buyers about claims relating to defects in real property, commercial and residential, after the closing.  They are disappointed that some aspect of the property or another is defective, and demand repairs paid by the seller.  Cracks in a concrete slab, mold, water leaks in plumbing, roofs and basements, and present or past termite infestation and damage are just a few of the common complaints.

The law on this topic is well-developed in Ohio.  Under Layman v. Binns and Traverse v. Long, the Ohio Supreme Court has clearly adopted the doctrine of caveat emptor, or “buyer beware.”  The Court has pronounced that buyers have no cause of action against a seller unless either (a) the defect was not discoverable upon a reasonable inspection and the seller knew about the defect or (b) the seller took steps to actively conceal or lie about the defect.

So, the Layman standard sets up a difficult factual challenge: a plaintiff must show that the damages were not reasonably discoverable by him on inspection, but on the other hand, as of the time of the litigation, the problems are so great that (a) the seller certainly knew about them and (b) they deserve significant recompense by the Court.  This is a vexing problem for every property defects plaintiff, commercial or residential.

The Layman case was decided in 1988, and then only a few years later the Ohio legislature affirmatively mandated for single family homes the use of the Ohio Residential Property Disclosure Form.  The current version of that form is here.

Because either affirmatively covering up a defect or making an affirmative misrepresentation can be the basis for liability under Layman, a misrepresentation on the Residential Property Disclosure Form can form the basis for liability under Ohio law.  Indeed, in our experience on property defects cases for residential properties, a mis-statement on a Residential Property Disclosure Form is the most common basis for these liability claims.

When pursuing a property defects claim, the plaintiff has several legal causes of action (i.e., bases under the law for suit).  These include breach of contact, misrepresentation and fraud.  Of these, only the fraud claim can be the grounds for recovery of attorneys fees and punitive damages, and our experience is that — even under that cause of action — state court judges in Ohio are extremely reluctant to arrive at liability including punitive damages and attorneys fees.  As such, a Plaintiff should enter into the litigation understanding that a “win” involving reimbursement of his fees invested in the case are unlikely.

In the commercial setting, where actual damages arising from the defect may be in the hundreds of thousands and millions of dollars, litigation may yield an economically positive outcome.  However, in the residential setting, buyers must carefully consider the cost-benefit of pursuing this litigation.  Conversely, a seller defending against such a claim may want to consider what he must invest in that defense, versus an early settlement.

Given that our firm’s objective for each matter assigned to us is to “make a difference” for the client, we carefully work with clients in property defects litigation to develop a strategy that is most likely to result in a net positive outcome for the client.

There are almost as many types of covenants against residential subdivisions as there are subdivisions, as covenants are first and foremost a matter of “contract,” and not a function of statute.

That is not to say that there are no statutory constraints on residential subdivision covenants, as Ohio Revised Code Chapter 5312 “Ohio Planned Community Law” does set forth a framework of certain minimum requirements for subdivision documents and does require that bylaws of an association be recorded.  But beyond that framework, that statute does not precisely say what the declaration and bylaws must provide.

As such, the developer decides — in the declaration of covenants  against the subdivision and bylaws of the association — what terms that “contract” will contain.  And then each owner acquiring a lot in that subdivision, whether he knows it or not, becomes a party to that “contract” on the terms set forth in the declaration and bylaws of the association.

The first issue we explore in this article is “homeowners’ association or no homeowners’ association?” for there are subdivisions subject to a declaration and covenants as to the development (minimum square footages, setbacks, design standards, etc.) and use (parking of boats and R.V.s on lots, rental of houses, parking restrictions, etc.) of real estate, that do not have a homeowners’ association and the monthly or annual fees that accompany the same.  Some developers — typically of smaller subdivisions — choose not to create a homeowners’ association because there are no common areas (lakes or detention ponds, entrance monuments, etc.) to maintain.  As such, a there is no reason to assess a fee.  And without a fee being due and owing, there is no need for an association to manage that fund.  In this circumstance, without an association, enforcement of the covenants is then left to the individual lot owners.

Thus, not all subdivision covenants include an association or a fee that accompanies the same.

Then, onto the covenants themselves.  The covenants are a “contract” by and among the lot owners on the terms set forth therein.  Because parties are free to contract except as to those things prohibited by law (e.g., unlawful discrimination), the “contract” can contain such restrictions as the initial developer thinks appropriate.  As such, a buyer should carefully review and consider these restrictions before buying.  Are they too restrictive as to the lifestyle choices of the prospective homeowner?  Are they not sufficiently restrictive on the homeowners’ soon-to-be-neighbors?  These documents make good bedtime reading.

Finally, a note of caution as to covenants that do establish a homeowners association: Be cognizant of the powers vested in that association, as to setting fees, maintaining common areas, enforcing covenants and making new rules, as many times the exercise of those powers by the association can be the source of frustration for homeowners in the subdivision.

We caution clients to be mindful of all of the provisions of covenants for their subdivision, as it typically will the longest, most complicated “contract” they will ever enter into.  And part of that is understanding the powers given to the homeowners association in those documents.

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Read more on this topic: Condominium versus Landominium — What’s the difference under Ohio Law? >>

Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1923 provides a method of judicially acquiring possession of property back from a residential tenant.  This is commonly referred to as an eviction.  Under the Revised Code it is referenced as an action in “forcible entry and detainer.”

But that Chapter does not apply to commercial tenants.  Thus, the question:

May an Ohio landlord for non-residential property lock out a tenant who is in default of his lease obligations (after any contractual notice and right to cure) without a judicial proceeding?  

The short answer: Yes.

Ohio law provides that a commercial landlord may lock out a tenant under the following circumstances:

  1. The Tenant clearly is in default (for the landlord would not want to risk damages arising from a lockout if his claim is marginal).
  2. The written lease itself allows for such a remedy.
  3. All notice and right to cure provisions for the default have been provided and expired.
  4. The landlord can accomplish the lock out without “disturbing the peace.”
  5. Finally, the landlord by the lock out, may not seize control or ownership of the tenant’s contents — his personal property or trade fixtures.  Thus, he should make accommodations with the tenant to retrieve his contents.

Finally, we advise commercial landlords that despite the fully developed law on this topic, tenants seem to have a proclivity to litigate the occupancy question.

This is a powerful tool for landlords in Ohio, but one that should be used reservedly.

In what has been described as a Quixotic legal mission, Starr International Company, Inc. challenged the government’s takeover of A.I.G. Insurance at the height of the national’s financial crisis in 2008.  Then, the U.S.A. seized ownership of 79.9% of the company in exchange for a forced bailout loan.  The Plaintiffs sought $40 billion in damages from the government in the litigation.

Judge Thomas C. Wheeler of the United States Court of Federal Claims found that the government was free to make loans to distressed entities, but to seize the ownership interest “constituted an illegal exaction under the Fifth Amendment.”

The decision and important briefs in the case are here.  A New York Times story on the decision is here.

In this prior blog entry, we explore the distinction between escrow deposits and earnest money in Ohio, and the fact that these two things are not a measure of or limitation on damages sustained for a breach of a real estate purchase contact.

This article seeks to bust a common myth about an escrow deposit: That a seller must return the earnest money of a buyer he claims is in breach before selling the home to a second buyer.

Here’s the scenario: Buyer #1 signs a contract to purchase a property with earnest money held in escrow by the Realtor, and then fails to perform.  Sometimes the buyer claims one of his contingencies was not fulfilled (financing, inspection, etc.) and the seller disagrees that buyer attempted in good faith to fulfill that contingency.  Other times, the buyer has just flat-out breached the contract.

In either scenario, seller has refused to consent to the release of the escrowed funds back to the buyer.  Indeed, he intends to hold the buyer responsible for the damages arising from the breach.

Now, Buyer #2 comes along, and the seller desires to sell the property to Buyer #2 free and clear of any claims of Buyer #1.  Does he have to release the escrowed funds to accept the second contract?  Does he have to waive the claims against Buyer #1?  No.

Many times the myth is advanced by an office manager of a realty company, either out of wisdom, to avoid unnecessary conflict and clean up loose ends, or because he is simply mistaken. [Indisputably, it may be advantageous to get a full release from Buyer #1 before proceeding with Buyer #2.]

But it would be entirely possible for a seller to sell to Buyer #2, and retain his claims for monetary damages arising from the breach against Buyer #1.  The seller is not required to release the earnest money to Buyer #1 at the time of signing contract #2.

Buyers are typically asked to place earnest money under a real estate purchase contract, residential and commercial. But who is holding this deposit? Can the buyer ever get it back?  Can the seller ever retrieve it out of escrow?  And is this a measure of or limit on damages on breach of contract by either the buyer or seller?

For contracts negotiated through Realtors for existing housing, the deposit is typically held in the Realtor’s escrow account pending closing. This means that neither the buyer nor the seller have access to those funds until surrendered to the seller at closing or returned to the buyer as a result of the failure of one or more contingencies.

Even though the Realtor is the “agent” of one party in the transaction, when acting as escrow agent, he must follow the escrow instructions – i.e., not surrender the earnest money to his client just because he is ordered to do so.  The escrow instructions are contractual provisions – either in the purchase contract or a separate escrow agreement – detailing how the escrow agent is to deal with the escrowed funds, or other escrowed property and documents.

In contrast, contracts with home builders, and For-Sale-By-Owner sellers (“FSBOs”) typically will call for the earnest money to be paid as a deposit directly to the builder or seller. In that circumstance, the seller has the money, and getting it back – even when the contract requires it – could prove problematic. For example, we have represented buyers in contracts in which the builder was headed into insolvency or bankruptcy.  In that circumstance, the earnest money deposit could be completely at risk if precautions have not been made against that eventuality.

Finally, a common misunderstanding of parties to a purchase contract is that the escrow money is some sort of measure of or limitation on damages for the buyer’s breach, or, conversely, that the return of the earnest money “cures” the seller’s breach and is the limitation on his damages as well. However, unless the real estate purchase contract specifically calls out either of those limitations, neither of those propositions is true.

We will explore in a separate blog entry the damages for which a buyer can be exposed for breach of a purchase contract. But as a general proposition, the seller is to be put in a position that he would be in but for buyer’s breach. That means the buyer is responsible for the reduced purchase price when the house sells to a second buyer, and may be exposed for the holding costs (insurance, taxes and maintenance costs) until the property re-sells. The seller, similarly, cannot just ignore his contractual promise to a buyer, and sell the property to another buyer.  He will be responsible to the original buyer for the lost value above the sale price and perhaps other damages to a buyer. The important point is that the earnest money – unless the contract specifically says otherwise – is not a definition of or limitation or either party’s damages upon breach.

Read more here: Myth busters: Further on earnest money >>

This article is the seventh in a series on new construction.  The contents of this series of articles apply to commercial as well as residential projects (this article being the only exception).

The issue of mechanics liens in Ohio is complex and involved in commercial projects.  But in the residential world (one and two-family residences), buyers are fully protected against mechanics liens so long as (i) they have paid the full amount due to the builder and (ii) they did not, before such payment, receive notice of the filing of a mechanics lien.  This protection applies in all three circumstances of (i) homes purchased from builders at the end of the construction process, (ii) homes built on the lot owned by a buyer, and (iii) existing home improvement contracts.

Further, the attempt to assert the right to a mechanics lien by a builder, subcontractor or materialman when these conditions have been met is the basis for a “slander of title” cause of action against such lien claimant.

The circumstances that give rise to liens against residential projects are generally either (i) a dispute between the buyer and the builder or (ii) a dispute between the builder and its subcontractors and materialmen, usually the latter.

The statute that provides this protection is O.R.C. Section 1311.011, which provides:

(1) No original contractor, subcontractor, material supplier, or laborer has a lien to secure payment for labor or work performed or materials furnished by the contractor, subcontractor, material supplier, or laborer, in connection with a home construction contract between the original contractor and the owner, part owner, or lessee or in connection with a dwelling or residential unit of condominium property, that is the subject of a home purchase contract, if the owner, part owner, or lessee paid the original contractor in full or if the purchaser has paid in full for the amount of the home construction or home purchase contract price, and the payment was made prior to the owner’s, part owner’s, or lessee’s receipt of a copy of an affidavit of mechanics’ lien pursuant to section 1311.07 of the Revised Code.

One key question is whether the “owner…has paid the original contractor in full.”  This does not necessarily mean the full contract price, but the actual amount owed after all setoffs and change orders.  Thus, if the original builder defaulted in the performance of its contract, and as a result the buyer does not owe him funds for the completion of the project, then nothing is owed (by the buyer or owner) to his various subcontractors and materialmen.

This statute also does not protect buyers who have actual notice of a lien, and still elect to pay a builder the remaining contract price.  Paying the builder without known lien claims resolved is simply foolish.

When a residential construction projects runs seriously “off the rails,” claims against homeowners can emanate from many parties.  But, unlike the commercial setting, residential buyers and owners are absolutely protected from these later-arising lien claims.

Our way of addressing this on behalf of homeowners is a simple letter to the lien holder to remove their claim or be exposed to damages claims from the buyer, which could include claims for punitive damages and attorneys fees.

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This article is one in a series on the Finney Law Firm blog on new construction.  Read more here:

New construction: The problem of “what” is to be built >>

New construction: The “when” >> 

New Construction: Change orders, allowances, and selections can significantly impact price >>

New Construction: On whose land are you building? >>

New construction: Cost-Plus versus Fixed-Price

New construction: What form of contract?