The Wisconsin Appellate Law report has this entry about a recent Seventh Circuit decision that shows the precarious position lenders are in in recovering their losses arising from their loans.  As that article recites, in BB Syndication Services, INc. v. First American Title Insurance the Federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a construction lender does not have a claim against the title insurer for liens that arose as a result of their cutting off funds to the project.

The Seventh Circuit relied upon a provision in the title insurance policy excluding coverage for liens “created, suffered, assumed or agreed to” by the insured lender.

The Court found that because the liens arose as a result of the  lender cutting off funds to the project (thus causing the borrower to default in his obligations to subcontractors and material men, and then liens to be filed against the project), coverage did not lie.

 

More than 99% of all petitions to the United States Supreme Court are rejected, meaning that the petitioner’s claims are never heard by the High Court.

In 2014, we were fortunate to have two cases — of about 100 in total addressed by the Court —  accepted.  And then we then won each by 9-0 decisions authored by Justice Clarence Thomas.   Inasmuch as this was the inaugural year of our new firm, this was an exceptional honor.

As we wrote here, we asked the U.S. Supreme Court to consider a third case this year — Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights.  In that case we filed what we refer to as a “me too” petition before the U.S. Supreme Court, one addressing issues otherwise before the Court, in this case Reed v. Town of Gilbert, AZ, which was heard by the Justices in oral argument by the Court back in January.

We could not say after the Court’s initial conference that the case had been accepted or rejected — rather they just held it in abeyance.

Last week, they ruled in favor of Reed in the Arizona litigation, vindicating the First Amendment rights of the petitioner in a case involving content discrimination by the Town of Gilbert as to yard signs.  Today, they issued their ruling in the Wagner case and ruled in favor of our client, Frank Wagner.  Wagner had been cited criminally by the City of Garfield Heights for placing a 4′ x 4′ sign in his yard critical of his city council member.

The case has now been sent back to the 6th Circuit for further consideration in light of the Reed decision.  You may read the SCOTUS order here.

As is explored here, the standard Cincinnati Area Board of Realtors contract launched late last year contains very substantial changes from prior forms published by the Board.  This is important, because this new form of Contract is in use by most Realtors in the greater Cincinnati area, so buyers and sellers are more likely to encounter it than not.

Issues not explored in the prior blog entry, however, are the significant “outs” in the new form Contract for buyers.  Historically, form residential contracts in use in greater Cincinnati would provide a standard inspection contingency and financing contingency, but otherwise, the buyer’s hands were tied in contract performance.

But under the new Board contract, the buyer has additional “outs” — the right to terminate the Contract — due to the failure of an appraisal contingency (paragraph 4) and for the non-approval of a variety of documents provided by the buyer relating to homeowners association covenants against the property (paragraph 8).

These provisions — especially the HOA covenant review — give the buyer broad rights to terminate the contract, leaving the seller to need to place the house back on the market, and find another buyer.

Read more: New Cincinnati Area Board of Realtors contract contains substantial changes >>

OK, we keep talking about it, but in reality “nothing” has happened yet with the Frank Wagner v. Garfield Heights case at the U.S. Supreme Court.

We filed the case and said it had issues that tracked the U.S. Supreme Court case of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, AZ.  And the Supreme Court agreed with that proposition, refusing to dismiss the case a the first conference, where 99% of all petitions die.  But neither did they accept the case.  It just was put on a pile “to be considered later.”

On Monday, the Town of Gilbert, AZ case was decided in favor of the Plaintiffs, and free speech, the same side as the Wagner case, advancing the issues on which we had won at the trial Court in that case.  Thus, if the U.S. Supreme Court follows its precedent set this week, we should “win” a third time in 18 months at the U.S. Supreme Court. Nothing is guaranteed, but the signs all look good.

Well, that “later” for Wagner is this Thursday.  And we are hopeful the result of that conference will be a big “Reverse and Remand” to the 6th Circuit.

We’ll keep you advised.

 

We have a fantastic (if we do say so ourselves) 8-part series on legal issues on new construction for residential and commercial projects. The series, as a general proposition, provides helpful information for both contractors (builders) and buyers.

New construction: The problem of “what” is to be built >>

New construction: The “When” >>

New construction: Change orders, allowances and selections can significantly impact price >>

New construction: On whose land are you building? >>

New construction: Cost-plus versus fixed-price >>

New construction: What form of contract? >>

New construction: Ohio residential buyers absolutely protected from liens in limited circumstances >>

New construction: Properly documenting change orders >>

If we can help you “Make a Difference” with documentation of a new construction project, contact Isaac T. Heintz at (513) 943-6654.  For a dispute relating to a new construction project, contact Brad M. Gibson at (513) 943-6661.

We explore the issues of insurers and indemnitors in these two previous articles:

Navigating turbulent waters: Insurers and indemnitors (Part 1) >>

Indemnities and Warranty Deeds: Open-ended access to your checkbook >>

These blog entries primarily provide an understanding of indemnities from two different perspectives: That of the indemnitee (the person who is protected under an indemnity), and that of the indemnitor (the person providing the protection).

In this article, we explore multiple facets of the indemnity, and its enforcement.

As a starting point, in contractual indemnities, various terminology is used for risk-shifting provisions:

  • Indemnify
  • Defend
  • Hold harmless

These three terms, to us, have different meaning, but in application courts have interpreted them interchangeably, or at least to overlap.

  • “Indemnify” is an open-ended commitment to both cover the expenses of a third party claim and potentially to defend against that action, i.e., pay the the indemnity attorneys fees.
  • “Defend” more specifically covers that obligation to protect the first party from suits.  It probably does not include a broad indemnity for the underlying liability.
  • And “hold harmless” generally means simply that the second party will himself not raise a claim against the first party for certain claims, almost like a prospective release.  “Party B will hold Party A harmless from claims relating to the underground storage tanks on the property.”

But, because courts fail to make these fine-line distinctions, when drafting contract provisions perhaps more precision as to what is intended is in order.  In some instances, a party will provide all three protections: “Tenant will indemnify, defend and hold harmless Landlord from all claims relating to his occupancy of the property.”  Other times, it would be appropriate to tighten the scope of the risk-shifting provision: “Landlord has disclosed to Tenant the leaking roof on the property, and Tenant agrees to hold harmless Landlord against claims relating to the same.”

Because contractual risk-shifting provisions essentially provide open-ended access to a checkbook of the indemnitor, great care should be exercised in agreeing to such provisions.  For, even if a claim ultimately is unfounded, the cost to defend can bankrupt even well-capitalized parties.  Consideration also should be given to indemnities that must be personally signed, thus voluntarily piercing the corporate veil carefully constructed to protect the individual owners.

Today, for example, it is common for lenders to ask that individual investors in a real estate transaction personally indemnify and defend a lender against environmental risks associated with real property being financed.  Caution should be exercised in undertaking such an open-ended risk.  For, the very reason we advise clients to take title to property in the form of an LLC or corporation is to shield the individual form such open-ended liability.  An indemnity blows past that carefully-planned protection.

Finally, how is an indemnity or insurance provision enforced when the indemnitor or insurer chooses to ignore his contractual obligation?  This can be accomplished in one of two ways:

  1. At the time the claim is pending, the indemnitee can bring a “declaratory judgment” action asking the Court to declare that the indemnitor provide the promised protection.
  2. After the fact, as long as proper demand has been made previously for such a defense, a monetary damages claim can be brought to compensate indemnitee for the damages caused by indemnitor’s breach of his contractual obligation.

In many ways indemnities are “super” contract provisions because instead of defining specific contractual obligations (e.g., to make payments, to pay taxes, or to repair a roof) they protect against open-ended and sometimes unknown obligations, and indeed obligations from third parties who are foreign to the transaction being undertaken.

Whenever I review a contract, a lease, a mortgage or loan agreement, or other contractual agreement for a client, my antenna is raised when I read that my client is agreeing to “indemnify,” “defend,” “hold harmless,” “protect” or words of similar impact some other party. Those “super” contract provisions should be undertaken with due consideration to the impact on the indemnitor.

 

In perhaps the most audacious litigation gambit I have been involved with for a client, we resuscitated a failed Ohio Supreme Court case with a U.S. District Court action that rendered a favorable settlement for our client over…the elimination of his curb cut.

Curbs serve several purposes on a roadway: They are part of the storm water management system, moving water along a road’s edge into a storm sewer, and they operate as an important traffic control mechanism, whereby access onto roadways to and from individual properties is “regulated” by “curb cuts.”  A curb cut is the lowering or elimination of an otherwise continuous curb along a roadway, that is too high for traffic to traverse, to allow ingress and egress into private property.

Ohio has a long and rich tradition of allowing, as a constitutional right, access to one’s property through a curb cut onto a public road. See, e.g., OTR v. Columbus (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 203, 667 N.E.2d 8.

With that as background, in 1998 our client, Preschool Development Co., developed its property along S.R. 73 in Springboro, Ohio into a preschool.  It purchased a single family residence that enjoyed an existing curb cut onto S.R. 73, demolished the building, and proposed to build a new preschool there with direct access onto S.R. 73.  The City of Springboro at first conditioned zoning approval of the new development on a promise from the developer that when a new drug store was developed next door, we would close our curb cut onto S.R. 73, and access our property only through the drug store parking lot.  We objected, citing to the constitutional principle noted above.  Eventually, the owner reached a contractual agreement with the City that when the drug store parcel ultimately was developed, the owner would install, at its expense, a median in S.R. 73, thus preventing left turns into and out of the property, a reasonable compromise that allowed the development to go forward while at the same time improving traffic safety along S.R. 73.

As a side note, Ohio law provides, and we certainly believe, that municipalities can require anything they want to assure traffic safety along their roads.  But, if they are going to unconstitutionally burden a property to accomplish that, they simply must pay just compensation to the owner to achieve that end.  That is the law.

Fast forward 48 months and the new drug store parcel is being developed.  The City makes a renewed demand upon the property owner to close his curb cut and access his preschool parcel through the drug store parking lot.  We located and dusted off the agreement calling for a median in S.R. 73, instead, and the City persisted.  We resisted.

Finally, one fine July Monday morning, my client calls and informs me that, overnight, the City closed his curb cut by building a 6-inch curb in front of his property.  His only access to his property is across the drug store parcel.  Even worse, he has no legally-enforceable easement across the drug store parcel parking lot, meaning the City of Springboro has effectively land-locked his parcel and rendered it unmarketable.

Under constitutional principles, one is unable to sue a City directly for damages arising from a “taking,” but rather you sue the municipality –in what is called a mandamus action — to make them sue you for eminent domain – and establish judicially in that second proceeding the value of the property taken.  Under Ohio law, Plaintiffs have a choice for “mandamus actions,” to proceed initially and directly at the Common Pleas Court, the Court of Appeals, or at the Ohio Supreme Court.  Since the law and facts were clearly on our client’s side, we elected to take the case directly and initially to the Ohio Supreme Court.

So we proceeded in an original action at the Ohio Supreme Court for a mandamus requiring that the City “take” our client’s property and pay him just compensation for it.  As noted above, this action was supported by a long line of Ohio cases providing that a Curb Cut was a constitutionally-protected interest in Ohio that cannot be taken without just compensation.  We were certain the Supreme Court would grant the requested relief, and our client would be compensated for his loss.  This confidence was compounded by the fact that the “taking” was not just of a curb cut, but of all legal access to my client’s property – rendering it value-less.

Much to our surprise, the Ohio Supreme Court, in this 4-3 decision, denied our client’s requested relief. They essentially ignored 150 years of precedent on the topic – and the further defective easement rendering our client’s property worthless – in what we felt was a bad decision.  The problem was, that by electing to first go to the Supreme Court for our relief, there was no court to which we could appeal the decision.  In short, our client was stiffed.

But we were not content to rest on that outcome.  The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution provides that “private property” shall not be “taken for public use, without just compensation.”  Thus, again, the City, the State, have the right to take our client’s property (his curb cut access to S.R 73), but they must pay for it.  There is federal precedent that when the State’s courts refuse to provide a mechanism to provide that just compensation – in Ohio a mandamus action – one can avail themselves of a remedy directly in federal court.

As a huge bonus to our client, an award of attorneys fees is generally not available to a Plaintiff either for a mandamus action forcing the bringing of a condemnation action, or for the defense of the action to establish damages — thus making much of this litigation impractical if not impossible.  But when the State has effectively denied the Plaintiff any remedy for the taking, an action lies under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1988, which includes the right in the victorious Plaintiff to recover attorneys fees.  In a perverse way, the Ohio Supreme Court had done us huge a favor by making ripe our federal constitutional claims by denying the takings claim in State court.

Thus, we filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and drew knowledgeable Judge Arthur Spiegel.  Judge Spiegel was fantastic, from the first meeting of the litigants forward.  For, as a young attorney, he too was a real estate lawyer, and intuitively understood the principle that one has a property right in and to a curb cut, and was prepared to enforce that right.

The litigation was complex and arduous, with laborious motion work, discovery, expert witnesses, and hearings lasting more than a year.  The matter was complicated by issues of res judicata and issue preclusion, as well as the difficult-to-interpret, difficult-to-apply Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   Hundreds of hours were spent on briefing, and tens of thousands of dollars were invested on expert witness testimony.

In the end, we filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the question of liability.  The City filed a cross motion for summary judgment seeking essentially to extend and enforce the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court.  Judge Spiegel thankfully issued a decision – which we thought correct – granting partial summary judgment to the Plaintiff on the issue of liability.  Thus, we were headed to trial solely on the question of the value of the taking exacted by the City of Springboro.  It was a long-fought-for and sweet victory.

Facing that consequence — a trial solely on damages, where the City would have to pay Plaintiff’s attorneys fees, the City quickly settled – paying our client a fair amount for the “taking” and the full sum of all our client’s attorneys fees expended in the matter.

After five years of battle, the client was completely made whole.


Our deep knowledge of Ohio real estate law, combined with our extensive public interest law experience and incredible persistence and resilience, surely made a difference not only for this client, but to vindicate an important constitutional principle for all Ohioans.

We had planned on an insightful analysis of the Reed v. Town of Gilbert decision, for, as our loyal blog readers know, this decision is of keen interest to us.  This is so because we have a “me too” petition pending before the Supreme Court on a case involving very similar issues of law and fact, Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights.  If the U.S. Supreme Court properly follows the Town of Gilbert precedent set today, we should notch our 3rd U.S. Supreme Court win for the firm in only 18 months of existence.  Hopefully, that will come before the end of the month.

But such work detailing the Town of Gilbert decision is not needed, because Professor Volokh in his Volokh Conspiracy column and web page for the Washington Post tackles the analysis for us, here: Supreme Court reaffirms broad prohibition on content-based speech restrictions, in today’s Reed v. Town of Gilbert decision.

So, read it and rejoice in the affirmation of our First Amendment liberties.  We shall instead of writing, head to the pool!