Earlier this year, the Finney Law Firm obtained a favorable settlement for five special needs children within the Kings Local School District who were severely mistreated by their teacher, and the firm continues to proudly represent its clients in other similar cases. However, a decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals may have heightened the burden imposed on plaintiffs bringing substantive due process claims, which was one of several causes of action alleged in the Kings case.
Substantive due process, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, forbids government actors, including public school teachers, from intruding into the fundamental rights promised to individuals under the U.S. Constitution. Relevant here are the “rights to be free from physical abuse at the hands of state actors, and to enjoy personal security and bodily integrity in an educational setting.” Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987).
In Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016), the Court applied the “shocks the conscience” standard used in substantive due process cases in a way that may very well place an insurmountable obstacle in the way of students seeking to hold their teachers accountable for constitutional violations in the classroom.
The plaintiffs in Domingo, special needs students as young as six years old, brought a substantive due process suit against their teacher alleging that she:
abused her students during the 2003-2004 school year by, among other things, gagging one student with a bandana to stop him from spitting, strapping another to a toilet to keep her from falling from the toilet, and forcing yet another to sit with her pants down on a training toilet in full view of her classmates to assist her with toilet-training.
Despite finding that the teacher’s actions were improper, the Sixth Circuit refused to hold the teacher liable, reasoning that her conduct did not “shock the conscience.” In so finding, the Court borrowed the Third Circuit’s “shocks the conscience” test, which ultimately requires that the actor have malicious or sadistic intent, which the Domingo Court did not find. Requiring such bad intent is an extremely high standard, making it challenging, at best, for many plaintiffs to meet even in cases as egregious as Domingo. In light of the conduct permitted in Domingo, it is difficult to imagine exactly what type of classroom conduct would shock the conscience.