Finney Law Firm is a growing firm that strives to make a difference in the greater Cincinnati area through their personal and professional work.  Members of this firm have extensive experience in a broad range of legal services including business formation and development, litigation, real estate, estate planning and administration, commercial dispute resolution, criminal defense, bankruptcy, and public interest law.  The desire is to represent clients, hire employees, and work with vendors who share in the Firm’s key standards of Integrity, Accountability, Communication, and Excellence.

Job Overview

As a growing company with offices in Eastgate and Mt. Adams, Finney Law Firm seeks to hire an Assistant Bookkeeper to contribute to the success of the Firm.  The primary functions of this position will be to assist and support the accounting and bookkeeping efforts for the Company.  A desirable candidate will be able to successfully:

  • Enter and record accurate financial information
  • Process the Firm expenses with a detailed accounting trail
  • Oversee and maintain the credits and debits of various accounts
  • Manage the day to day financial transactions for multiple accounts
  • Assist in managing the billing cycle by processing, reviewing, and sending out monthly invoices
  • Communicate and coordinate with staff, clients, and other points of contact
  • Perform additional responsibilities to assist the Bookkeeper with day to day operational needs

Required Skills and Abilities

  • Strong emphasis on being detail oriented
  • Ability to multi-task and work in a fast paced environment
  • Willing to work individually and as part of a team
  • Experience with QuickBooks and advanced Excel skills preferred
  • College degree or accounting/bookkeeping experience required

How to Apply and Additional Information

Interested candidates should email a cover letter, resume, and professional references to Katherine Fox at [email protected].  A review of applications will begin immediately.  This position is full time and benefits are available.

Our firm sometimes receives inquiries about areas of the law that few even consider until they are facing a potential lawsuit. Recently, one of those inquiries was whether one can be responsible for his or her tree falling and harming another or their property.

Generally, land owners do not owe a duty with regard to harm caused to another as a result of some natural condition of the land, provided that the harm occurs outside of the land. Heckert. V. Patrick, 473 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ohio 1984). However, there are some exceptions with regard to injuries resulting from falling trees and/or branches. Id. at 1207.

“[A]n owner of land abutting a highway may be held liable on negligence principles under certain circumstances for injuries or damages resulting from a tree or limb falling onto the highway from such property.” Id. For example, “a possessor of land in an urban area is subject to liability to persons using a public highway for physical harm arising from the condition of trees near the highway.” This duty of an urban landowner includes a duty to inspect the tree to make sure that it is safe. Id. This is because urban landowners are thought to have fewer trees – thus, it is not too great of a burden to do so. See id.

However, for rural landowners, who potentially own entire forests of trees, an affirmative duty to inspect the trees would likely amount to a very heavy burden. Id. Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court has adopted a distinction between rural and urban landowners in this respect. Id. As such, rural landowners have no duty to inspect trees growing on their property adjacent to rural highways, or to ascertain defects that may result in injury to someone travelling on the highway, but, to the extent a rural landowner has “knowledge, actual or constructive, of a patently defective condition of a tree,” that landowner must exercise reasonable care to prevent harm. Id. Constructive knowledge can result from the appearance of the tree, thereby giving notice to an owner that the tree is not in good shape and could fall. In recognition that the distinction between rural and urban areas may not always be an easy one to make as suburbia continues to grow and expand, the Court also provided a list of factors to be considered when making such determination, including “the location of the highway, its size and type, as well as the number of people utilizing it.” Id. at 1208.

Courts have generally applied the law as it relates to rural landowners to cases involving trees falling onto neighbors’ property (i.e., the landowner will be liable to the neighbor where the landowner has actual or constructive knowledge that the tree is defective. See Johnston v. Filson, 2014-Ohio-4758 (12th Dist. 2014) (granting summary judgment to a landowner upon finding that the landowner did not have actual or constructive notice of the tree’s condition); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flynn, 2013-Ohio-1501 (4th Dist. 2013) (finding that photographs of a tree significantly leaning toward the neighbor’s house presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable person should have known that the tree posed a danger); Wertz v. Cooper, 2006-Ohio-6844 (4th Dist. 2006) (granting summary judgment in favor of landowner for damage resulting from the landowner’s tree falling onto its neighbor’s property because the neighbor failed to establish that the landowner had either actual or constructive knowledge of a patent dangerous condition of the tree).

So while, in most cases, you will not have an affirmative duty to go out and inspect every single tree on your property, actual or constructive (visible) notice that the tree is not in good shape could create liability if that tree were to fall and cause harm. The lesson? Don’t ignore unhealthy or potentially problematic trees/limbs.

When purchasing a home, most buyers take advantage of the common “home inspection contingency,” affording them the opportunity to have the property professionally inspected in order to reveal potential defects before moving forward with the purchase. For their own protection, many home inspectors have begun including clauses limiting their liability to the price paid for the inspection in their contracts. In essence, this means that, if an inspector charges $500 for the inspection but misses a defect that costs the buyer/homeowner $2,000, the inspector is only liable (if at all) up to the $500 amount, not the full cost of remedying the defect. But are these clauses actually enforceable?

Ohio courts seem to say “Yes.” Home buyers have argued that the clauses are unconscionable (or unfair). However, courts have noted that the clauses appear on the face of the contract, that buyers are able to read the contract and ask questions before signing, and that buyers are permitted to decline the clause or the contract or hire another inspector altogether if they do not agree to the clause. See Barto v. Boardman Home Inspection, Inc., 2015-Ohio-5210, ¶19 (11th Dist. 2015).  Therefore, such clauses are generally not considered unconscionable, and courts have continued to enforce them.

In fact, clauses limiting the liability of inspectors have even been enforced where they effectively preclude enforcement of arbitration clauses contained within the same contract. In McDonough v. Thompson, the parties were required under their contract to resolve any disputes through arbitration. 2004-Ohio-6647, ¶¶2-3 (8th Dist. 2004).  However, because the filing fee for arbitration exceeded the inspector’s maximum liability under the contract (i.e., the price of the inspection), the court declined to enforce the arbitration clause, but did enforce the limitation of liability. See generally id. The court found that “an arbitration clause is not enforceable when the clause, in conjunction with a limitation of liability clause, effectively denies a claimant any redress.” Id. at ¶13. Thus, not only are these clauses enforceable, but they seem to be enforceable even to the preclusion of other clauses carrying a general presumption of enforceability (as arbitration clauses do).

In light of the courts’ eagerness to enforce limitation of liability clauses in this context, a buyer’s best remedy might actually be against the seller of the home (to the extent the seller may have concealed or lied about the defect), and those cases can often be tenuous.

Read more here about home defects and residential property disclosure forms:

 

President Trump’s SCOTUS Nominee Neil Gorsuch

Our firm practices extensively in the First Amendment arena.  Thus, it was with great interest that we saw this article on the SCOTUS Blog on U.S. Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch’s First Amendment jurisprudence.

A quick summary:

In many ways, Gorsuch’s opinions in this area are similar to those of the late Justice Antonin Scalia – with the possible exception that Gorsuch has been more willing to find not only that the First Amendment has been violated, but also that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity in those cases.

It appears the First Amendment will continue to have solid backing from SCOTUS with Justice Gorsuch on the Court.

Soon-to-be-Judge Curt C. Hartman

We are pleased to pass along this press release from the office of Governor John Kasich that was just posted a few minutes ago.  It tells us that our very own Curt C. Hartman — “of counsel” to this firm since its inception — is being appointed to the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court.

Mr. Hartman is an extraordinary litigator.  He primarily has handled this firm’s appellate practice, including convincing the United States Supreme Court three times to accept cases of this firm, and winning each 9-0.  He also has handled numerous cases before the Ohio Supreme Court, Ohio’s many appellate Courts, and 6th Circuit Court of Appeals.

“We are sad to lose such a capable litigator from our ranks,” said Finney Law Firm owner Christopher P. Finney.  “But we are thrilled for the people of Hamilton County to have such a capable judge on the bench.  It is to the considerable credit of Governor Kasich that he recognized the talent of Curt Hartman and elevated him to this important position.  Congratulations to our own Curt C. Hartman!”

Mr. Hartman will be sworn in before month’s end.  Stay tuned for details of the ceremony.

Every parcel of real property in Ohio undergoes a major “reappraisal” by the County Auditor’s office every six years and then a minor “update” in the three years in the middle of that six-year cycle.  Different counties in Ohio are on a different six year and three year cycle.

Below are listed the counties that went through a major “Reappraisal” in 2016 (that new value first appearing on the January 2017 tax bill) and a minor “update” in 2016 (that new value also first appearing on the January 2017 tax bill).

The other thing important about the valuation cycle is that regardless of whether another tax complaint was brought previously, every property owner has the right to challenge his property’s assessment before the Board of Revision in the new triennial.

The schedule of counties starting a new triennial this year follows:

Reappraisal Counties
Adams
Columbiana
Hancock
Hocking
Holmes
Lawrence
Meigs
Monroe
Paulding
Scioto
Tuscarawas
Washington

Update Counties
Carroll
Champaign
Clark
Fairfield
Logan
Marion
Medina
Miami
Ross
Union
Wyandot

If you’d like our assistance with a property valuation, use our secure contact page, or contact Christopher P. Finney at 513-943-6655.

A common question I get is whether an employer must pay an employee for their accrued but unused vacation when they leave employment. If an employee has left under difficult circumstances, such as an involuntary discharge, there can easily be a dispute about post-employment issues like this.

Under Ohio law, accrued vacation is considered an earned benefit that the employee has a legal entitlement to. Therefore, an employee’s right to pay for vacation that was not used during employment will normally survive the employee’s termination or resignation, and payment will be owed.

I say “normally” because an employer can change this through a written policy that is clearly communicated to employees, in an employee handbook or otherwise. If the employer promulgates a policy stating that any unused vacation pay is forfeited when employment ends, that policy is legally enforceable, notwithstanding the general rule.

Employers should carefully consider whether to have a blanket policy like that, however, as it can lead to some harsh results. And some employees who are planning to quit, being aware that their vacation pay will be lost when they leave, will simply take their vacation right before they resign – and quit without notice as soon as they return.

For some employers, a sensible middle ground may be to have a policy stating that vacation pay is forfeited only under certain circumstances – such as if an employee is discharged “for cause,” or if she or he leaves without giving two weeks notice.

Please contact us to discuss what makes the most sense for your business, or if you have questions about you right to vacation pay.

Hamilton County Common Pleas Judge Steven E. Martin

In a case expected to be appealed to Ohio’s Supreme Court, Hamilton County’s First District Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of Common Pleas Judge Steven Martin in Vontz v. Miller, et al., 2016-Ohio-8477, that the fifty percent owner of a closely held corporation owes her co-owner a heightened fiduciary duty of “utmost good faith.”

Two siblings share ownership of a beer and wine distributorship – both owning fifty percent of the shares of the company. Thus, argued Miller, neither has a controlling ownership. However, in this instance, the company’s board consisted of Vontz, Miller, and Miller’s husband and two children. Thus, while Vontz is a fifty percent shareholder, the board is dominated by Miller.

Vontz, in an effort to balance control of the company, had sought to call a shareholder meeting to elect a new board. Miller refused. Vontz then brought suit against his sister and her family.

Judge Martin issued an injunction to force a shareholder meeting. Miller and her family appealed. Arguing, in part that Miller, as a fifty percent owner (i.e. less than a majority owner) did not owe a fiduciary duty to her brother who also owned exactly fifty percent of the company. Absent a fiduciary duty to her brother, Miller should not be required to attend or otherwise acquiesce to a shareholder meeting.

The court found that where, as here, one owner dominated the board and refused to adhere to corporate formalities (e.g. holding shareholder meetings where that owner’s family could be removed from the board), then the heightened fiduciary does attach – despite the semantic arguments over whether there can ever be a “controlling shareholder” where two owners each hold fifty percent ownership:

Because Miller so dominated the corporation that she was in control to the exclusion of Vontz, the unusual facts of this case demonstrated that Miller was the controlling shareholder, even though she owned only 50 percent of the voting shares.

Under her heightened duty of good faith and loyalty, she had an obligation of fairness to Vontz. Her duty required her to act for his benefit by protecting his right to vote for the election of new directors. She breached that duty because, as Vontz clearly demonstrated, he was unable to exercise his voting power due to a freeze-out by Miller.

The Court of Appeals, while ordering modifications to some of the particulars of Judge Martin’s ruling, upheld the substance of Martin’s ruling.

Closely held corporations bring with them unique challenges, particularly when the owners are family as well as business partners. Finney Law Firm, can help you avoid these pitfalls ahead of time and navigate through them if a challenge has already arisen.

Preble County Common Pleas Court Judge David Abruzzo

It is a common maxim that you are always liable for your own torts. Meaning, if someone is injured as the result of your own negligence, you will be liable, even when acting through a corporation or limited liability company.

A recent 12th District Court of Appeals case out of Preble County (Whitson v. One Stop Rental Tool and Party, et al. CA 2016-03-004) illustrates one major caveat to the maxim: parties to a contract can agree to hold the other party harmless for negligence, nonetheless, “contract clauses that relieve a party from its own negligence, while generally upheld, are not favored by the law and are to be strictly construed.”

Richard rented a bounce house from One Stop Rental Tool and Party. While Richard was unloading the bounce house from his pickup truck, the strap he was pulling broke and Richard fell out of the truck, onto the ground, suffering serious injuries.

Richard and his wife sued One Stop alleging negligence, loss of consortium, and malicious conduct (alleging that One Stop disregarded the probability that Richard would be injured in such a manner).

The rental agreement included a Release that read in relevant portion:

I understand and acknowledge that the activity to be engaged in through my rental of an inflatable, interactive amusement device, brings with it both known and unanticipated risks to guests, my invitees, and myself. Those risks include, but are not limited to fallings, slipping, crashing, and colliding and could result in injury, illness, disease, emotional distress, death and/or property damage to myself or my guests and invitees. I voluntarily release, indemnify, hold harmless and discharge One Stop Tool Rental, Inc. from any and all liability claims, demands, actions or rights of actions, whether personal to me or to a third party which are related to[,] arise out of or are in any way connected with my rental of the unit, including those allegedly attribute[d] to negligent acts or omissions. I agree to reimburse any reasonable attorney’s fees and costs which may be incurred by One Stop Rental Tool Rental, Inc. in the defense of any such liability claim, demand, action or right of action.

And a Hold Harmless Clause:

HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT. Customer agrees to assume the risks of, and hold Dealer harmless for, property damage and personal injuries, including death and dismemberment, caused by the equipment and/or arising out of Dealer’s negligence.

Preble County Common Pleas Judge David NAbruzzo, a no nonsense judge whom we have had the pleasure of appearing before, granted summary judgment against Richard, finding that the release and hold harmless clauses barred his claims, but allowing the wife’s loss of consortium claim to proceed.

The Court of Appeals noted that, “Richard did not read either document before signing them.”

Business owners should take this opportunity to review your contracts to determine if a hold harmless clause or mutual release clause are necessary; and make sure that such clauses will survive being “strictly construed” by the court. For consumers, this should serve as a reminder to read and understand the contract before signing.

  • posted: Feb. 24, 2017
  • Hemmer DeFrank Wessels PLLC
  • Uncategorized

Written By: Scott R. Thomas

 

A dispute is brewing in Philadelphia that will test the shield of the Catholic Church against government intrusion into its affairs.  On February 7th, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania heard arguments in Chestnut Hill College v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.  The case examined the core of Chestnut Hill College’s character as an educational institution.  The Court will determine whether the school founded in 1924 by the Sisters of Saint Joseph is a religious college whose internal decisions are beyond the reach of governmental review, or rather a secular place of learning, subject to all sovereign scrutiny.

The case arises from Chestnut Hill’s decision to expel a senior in 2012.  The student produced a play.   The proceeds were to be donated to the Lupus Foundation.  The student was told to deposit the proceeds in the Student Activities Safe so that the money could later be donated as promised.  Instead, the student deposited nothing, donated $500 to Lupus, and spent $800 on a cast party where alcohol was served to minors in violation of school policy and Pennsylvania law.

A disinterested professor conducted a hearing and, on the basis of the facts presented, recommended that the student be expelled.  The student appealed to the College Appeals Board.  The four Board members—one of whom was a student—unanimously supported the expulsion recommendation.   The recommendation was ultimately adopted by the Chestnut Hill president.  Mr. Meads then appealed to the Commission, charging that his expulsion violated the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act because it was the product of religious discrimination.

Chestnut Hill asked the Commission to dismiss the charge on grounds that, as a religious institution, the Act was inapplicable to it.  The Commission denied Chestnut Hill’s request last May and the College brought an appeal in state court.  Chestnut Hill wants Mr. Meads’ case dismissed.  The Commission wants the Court to allow the case to proceed so it may determine whether Mr. Meads’ claim has validity.  The Court will make its own decision, without regard to the Commission’s initial ruling.

Both sides have raised procedural arguments in hopes of winning on a technicality.  For example, Chestnut Hill argues that Mr. Meads did not file his discrimination claim in a timely manner.  The Commission, on the other hand, argues that Chestnut Hill failed to follow the steps to obtain judicial review and has waived its rights.

The key issue, however, is whether Chestnut Hill is a “public accommodation” under the Act.  The Act defines “public accommodation” as an “accommodation, resort, or amusement which is open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public, including . . . colleges and universities . . . but shall not include any accommodations which are in their nature distinctly private.”

Chestnut Hill seems to have prior court decisions on its side.  In 1988, a Pennsylvania Court decided that a Catholic parochial school in Philadelphia was not a “public accommodation” because it was “distinctly private.”  Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.   The Court found that Catholic schools are an “integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic church” and the “raison d’etre of parochial schools is the propagation of religious faith.”  For those reasons, the Act was held to be inapplicable.

Chestnut Hill also argues that allowing the Commission to review its disciplinary decisions would violate its First Amendment rights.  In 1998, a Court held that the freedom of religion clause prevented courts from reviewing the disciplinary decisions of a Catholic parochial school in Allentown, saying: “whenever the question of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law [has] been decided by the . . . church . . ., the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final . . . .” Gaston v. Diocese of Allentown.

For its part, the Commission argues that those Court decisions—which involved elementary and high schools—should not apply to Catholic colleges.  The Commission offers no cases to support this view.  Nor does the Commission explain why a Catholic high school would be “a powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation” but a Catholic college somehow would not.

The Commission also emphasized that Chestnut Hill admits non-Catholic students.  This factor is unlikely to carry much weight because it was present in the 1988 Philadelphia case but did not prevent the Court from ruling in the school’s favor.  Finally, the Commission stresses that Chestnut Hill receives state and federal money.  No court, however, has held that the receipt of governmental aid somehow strips an institution of its character as a private, religious institution.

The Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations also submitted a brief as an “amicus curiae.”  This “friend of the court” brief was more sensational than legal and attributed positions to Chestnut Hill that the College never asserted.  Bold-face assertions—such as “Chestnut Hill College Should Not Be Allowed to Pick and Choose When and How It Will Discriminate on the Basis of Race”—are unlikely to persuade the judges on the merits.  The Philadelphia Commission almost argued “the sky is falling” when it predicted a decision in Chestnut Hill’s favor would enable 51 colleges, 12 hospitals and 5 health centers to discriminate on the basis of race with impunity.  These assertions seem to border on desperation and make Chestnut Hill’s arguments seem even stronger in comparison.

In its brief, Chestnut Hill quoted a 1985 decision in which a court wrote: “When Caesar enters the Temple to decide what the Temple believes, he can leave behind only his own views.”  This case will test that philosophy and decide whether the deference that Pennsylvania courts have shown to religious educational institutions for nearly three decades should continue.

If you would like more information about these issues, please contact Scott Thomas.   He welcomes the opportunity to work with you.  Scott’s direct line is 859.578.3862.  You can email him at [email protected].  If there is a particular topic you would like to see addressed in a blog, please send Scott an email with your ideas.